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THE REVOLUTION ENTERS THE COURT: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL 
REGULATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY  
Jordan Steiker* †
Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-
alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous 
wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most 
substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-
can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually 
commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. 
The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state 
legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing 
reach of the death penalty to studying its operation and limiting its reach. 
Unlike the issues of racial and economic disparities, the issue of wrongful 
convictions has had real public and political traction. Of course, the prospect 
of executing innocents has always lurked as a potential concern for the death 
penalty, but the apparent breadth of the problem in Illinois, coupled with the 
increased sophistication of DNA testing as a potential means of identifying 
innocents, pushed the issue to the social and political fore.  
The emerging question in the legal world is whether the concern about 
wrongful convictions has any jurisprudential significance. Over a decade 
ago, in Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court was not particularly welcom-
ing of the claim that the Constitution forbids the execution of innocents. 
Several justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, insisted that post-conviction 
proof of innocence did not establish a cognizable claim on federal habeas 
and that executive clemency has been and should remain the safety valve for 
convictions undermined by new evidence. Although the defendant lost that 
case, a majority of justices suggested that some post-conviction judicial fo-
rum must be available in capital cases where a death-sentenced inmate 
makes a “truly persuasive” showing of actual innocence. 
But how else is the prospect of wrongful convictions significant to death 
penalty law? So far, the courts have said very little. Most of the action is in 
state legislatures, which have considered (and in some cases adopted) new 
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Death sentences remain a notable exception, even for death-eligible of-
fenses. The number of capital sentences has dropped precipitously over the 
past decade, from a national average of over 300 per year in the mid-1990s 
to an average of less than 150 per year in 2003–04, the most recent two 
years for which data is available. The Court’s constitutional regulatory en-
terprise regarding the death penalty has always been motivated by the vast 
protections in capital cases designed to prevent wrongful convictions, in-
cluding alteration of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to a “beyond 
any doubt” standard, increased funding for capital defense lawyers, and 
greater access to DNA testing in capital cases. 
Enter the Supreme Court’s decision last term in Kansas v. Marsh. At 
first glance the case appears relatively mundane. Kansas’s death penalty 
statute requires imposition of death if the jury finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the “aggravating circumstances [are] not outweighed by any miti-
gating circumstances.” The defendant argued, and managed to persuade the 
Kansas Supreme Court, that the Constitution forbids requiring the death 
penalty in cases of “equipoise,” where aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are evenly balanced. From a doctrinal standpoint, the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s decision was a bit of a stretch, because the United States 
Supreme Court had already sustained Pennsylvania and Arizona provisions 
that likewise appeared to require jurors to impose death without independ-
ently requiring jurors to determine that death was the appropriate 
punishment. 
That the Supreme Court granted certiorari is somewhat of a puzzle. 
Kansas isn’t exactly a death penalty powerhouse (with a death row of eight 
and no executions in over 40 years, dating back to the era of the murders 
detailed in Truman Capote’s “In Cold Blood”), and there are few cases in 
which the Supreme Court has reversed a state high court decision finding 
federal constitutional error within a state death penalty scheme. Indeed, Jus-
tices Stevens and Scalia engage in a lengthy colloquy with Justice Stevens 
asserting that no substantial federal interest justifies reviewing state court 
over-enforcement of federal rights and Justice Scalia maintaining that the 
Kansas Supreme Court deprived the people of Kansas of their legitimate 
desire to implement the death penalty through their chosen approach. 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, seems to miss the 
boat. The defendant’s complaint was that the statute was “mandatory,” and 
the majority concluded that the Court’s decisions rejecting the mandatory 
imposition of the death penalty did not apply, because the jurors in Kansas 
were allowed to consider fully and give adequate effect to mitigating evi-
dence. But the real objection is that the statute is mandatory in a different 
sense. The equipoise provision “mandates” that ties go to the State in capital 
sentencing and that jurors must deliver death verdicts when aggravating and 
mitigating considerations are of equal strength. This sort of “mandatory” 
provision dictates a rule of decision (not necessarily a rule of exclusion with 
respect to mitigating evidence), and such a rule of decision runs counter to 
the Court’s overall effort to ensure that state schemes reliably sort out the 
worst-of-the-worst offenders. 
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Justice Souter’s dissent is remarkable. It is joined by three other Justices 
and it seems to travel the same path, though not as far, as Justice Black-
mun’s dissent from denial of certiorari more than a decade earlier, in 
Callins v. Collins, declaring that he will no longer tinker with the machinery 
of death. Instead of adopting Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall’s more 
general claim that the death penalty is inconsistent with prevailing standards 
of decency and serves no justifiable penological goal, Justice Souter and his 
fellow dissenters seem to be setting up the possibility that the death pen-
alty’s implementation is flawed in a way that might constitutionally compel 
courts to cabin its reach. In many respects, this dissent carries forward the 
same theme of Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Ring v. Arizona. In 
that opinion, Justice Breyer defended the essential role of juries in capital 
divide between death-eligibility under state law and states’ actual implemen-
tation of the death penalty. Given this animating concern and the recent 
exacerbation of this divide, it seems very odd (if not unconstitutional) for 
states to permit imposition of the death penalty in what are, by definition, 
“close” cases. Given that states have accomplished little in terms of narrow-
ing the reach of the death penalty via statutory definition (most states have 
been promiscuous in their enumeration of aggravating factors), they should 
at least require jurors to conclude that the circumstances of the offense and 
the offender overwhelmingly justify the imposition of the death penalty. At a 
minimum, capital instructions should directly ask jurors whether the death 
penalty is appropriate in light of all aggravating and mitigating factors. The 
problem with the Kansas statute is that it does neither, and permits—in fact 
requires—jurors to choose death when mitigation and aggravation are in 
balance. 
But the majority opinion is of little interest or significance. Even a deci-
sion favoring the Respondent would have resulted in a slight alteration of 
the statute so that aggravation would have to outweigh mitigation instead of 
allowing ties to go to the State. The real action and the true significance can 
be found in Justice Souter’s dissent and Justice Scalia’s concurrence. Justice 
Souter’s dissent concludes with something of a Brandeis brief. He argues 
that “a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in practical 
terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate,” and the new body 
of “fact” to which he refers is the discovery of wrongfully convicted death-
sentenced inmates. His dissent discusses the experience in Illinois, exalts the 
role of DNA in uncovering innocents on death row, and cites statistics about 
the number of “exonerated” inmates in recent years. Justice Souter con-
cludes by saying that we are in a “period of new empirical argument about 
how ‘death is different’” and he seems to suggest that death penalty doctrine 
should take account of the “cautionary lesson of recent experience” with 
wrongful convictions. Although he disclaims any interest in revisiting the 
constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole (“it is far too soon for any 
generalization about the soundness of capital sentencing across the coun-
try”), he suggests that we should be chastened by recent experience and 
reject state death penalty rules, such as the one in Kansas, that might gener-
ate additional error in our capital punishment systems. 
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His fear of foreign influence aside, Justice Scalia rightly appreciates the 
significance of Justice Souter’s opinion. Like Justice Blackmun’s and Jus-
tice Breyer’s preceding global attacks on the death penalty, this opinion 
seems to contain a gratuitous assault on the death penalty—gratuitous be-
cause of its generality and seeming unrelatedness to the doctrinal issues 
presented (Justice Scalia accuses the dissent of nailing its complaint to the 
door of the wrong church because this case involved a challenge to sentenc-
ing instructions and not to the guilt-innocence determination). Even Justice 
Souter’s comment that “it is far too soon” to consider the general soundness 
of American capital punishment, seems self-consciously aimed to raise the 
possibility of some future global empirical attack on the actual operation of 
the American death penalty system. When the Court chose to review the 
decisionmaking by detailing the many emerging failures of the American 
death penalty system. In his view, the jury sentencing right in capital cases 
emerges not from any general Sixth Amendment interest in juror decision-
making, but because doubts about the death penalty’s deterrence value, as 
well as concerns about its arbitrary, discriminatory, and wrongful imposi-
tion, require states to preserve the link between the community (via jurors) 
and death sentences. 
Justice Scalia, who had mildly and light-heartedly chastised Justice 
Breyer in Ring for joining the Court’s judgment despite his opposition to 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (suggesting that Justice Breyer “buy a ticket to Ap-
prendi-land”), reacts much more vehemently and acerbically to this dissent. 
First, Justice Scalia, relying on the work of others, challenges the empirical 
claim about the extensiveness of error in capital cases. According to Justice 
Scalia, the number of “true” exonerations (for “innocent” defendants, as 
opposed to those later deemed “not guilty,” or freed by legal error) is much 
smaller than Justice Souter’s sources claim. Second, Justice Scalia views the 
exoneration of many innocents before execution, coupled with the absence 
of any demonstrable wrongful execution in the modern era, as indicative of 
the health rather than the pathology of the current system. 
But Justice Scalia’s broader concern is that he regards Justice Souter and 
his fellow dissenters as grandstanding for an international stage. Justice 
Scalia takes a direct swipe at international opponents of the American death 
penalty, accusing them of “sanctimonious criticism” because “most of the 
countries to which these finger-waggers belong had the death penalty them-
selves until recently—and indeed, many of them would still have it if the 
democratic will prevailed.” Justice Scalia’s reaction seems peculiar given 
that the dissent makes no mention of world opinion or practice. But on the 
heels of Roper v. Simmons’s rejection of the death penalty for juveniles, in 
part based on overwhelming international condemnation of the practice, 
Justice Scalia apparently views the dissenters’ criticisms of the operation of 
state death penalty schemes as essentially designed “to impugn” the Ameri-
can death penalty “before the world.” This is a new angle, and readers of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion might be surprised to find that his comments are a 
response to a dissent in the U.S. Reports rather than to a speech delivered to 
the European Union. 
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Kansas Supreme Court decision, no one would have remotely thought that 
this technical case about Kansas’s statute would call into question the over-
all operation of the American death penalty system, and yet the four 
dissenters seem determined to at least raise the prospect. 
Justice Scalia’s contempt and anger thus stem from his (perhaps justifi-
able) belief that the dissenters are lying in wait for the opportunity to attack 
the death penalty as a whole, and his view that the dissenters are motivated 
or supported by international elites. Whatever the truth of the international 
connection (it was after all, Justice Kennedy—who votes with the majority 
in this case—who enthusiastically embraced international opinion in his 
opinion invalidating the death penalty for juveniles), the real prospect for 
wrongful convictions affecting death penalty jurisprudence will be whether 
the fear of executing innocents shifts public opinion at home. Both Justice 
Souter’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions are clearly attempting to inform this 
debate by appealing to the facts on the ground (none of which could be 
found in the parties’ briefs), and perhaps portend the movement toward a 
new era of empirically-informed death penalty jurisprudence. 
